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The methods used by the Naval Air Systems Command (NAV-
AIR) in the acquisition of Peculiar Ground Support Equip-
ment CPGSE) was the object of a study which reviewed policy,
procedures and management techniques. Particular emphasis
was placed on a review of the managerial innovations being
employed by the F-18 project, e.g., funds control by the
Assistant Project Manager for Logistics and phased support.
The study made several observations as to the potential
for success of the F-18 project's new methods. Additional-
ly, the authors recommended several changes to the NAVAIR
management structure for long-term improvement in PGSE ac-
quisition, the most significant of which involves the trans-
fer of the Ground Support Equipment Division (NAVAIR-5 34
)
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At the outset it is appropriate to define the general
class of equipment treated by this thesis. Broadly defined,
Ground Support Equipment (GSE) is that equipment which pro-
vides maintenance support directly to an aircraft weapons
system or an uninstalled aircraft component undergoing test
or repair. GSE is, for purposes of acquisition management,
divided into two broad categories ; Common Ground Support
Equipment (CGSE) and Peculiar Ground Support Equipment
(PGSE). As the name implies, CGSE is that GSE which is
used with more than one aircraft type or system and, simi-
larly, PGSE has specific application to only one such weapon
system. Classifying a piece of equipment as PGSE does not
mean that it is necessarily unique to a given aircraft, but
rather that it is unique to a particular system which may
be employed on several aircraft types.
It should also be noted that, with today's emphasis in
avionics support on Automatic Test Equipment (ATE), a PGSE
requirement is not necessarily for just hardware but can also
include software. For the purposes of this thesis, the terms




Until the late 1950' s, the sophistication of aircraft and
their weapons systems was such That even the support of

electronic subsystems could be accomplished with relatively
simple standard support equipment. Airborne equipment that
could not be repaired with simple test gear and standard
techniques was replaced at sea and either repaired on shore
or thrown away. Therefore, spare parts management was the
key to effective logistic support [Ref . 1]
.
In the early 1960 ' s, the Fleet saw the introduction of
the forerunners of a new generation in aircraft sophistica-
tion, the A- 6 and the E-2. Increased complexity resulted
in a greater need for specialized repair capabilities. With
system complexity came decreased Mean-Times-Between-Failures
(MTBFs) and the lack of a repair capability overloaded the
spare parts supply system, particularly in the limited con-
fines of a carrier. Moreover, repair became cost-effective
at deeper subsystem levels because of increased equipment/
component costs. These new demands on the Navy support sys-
tem paralleled similar developments in the other services.
Therefore, sophisticated equipment had to be repaired at sea
and in the field.
The BOD-wide impact was felt not only by support equip-
ment but also in areas such as training, manuals, technical
data and other support-related elements. Efforts in all of
these support areas became more complex and costly. Longer
lead times were also required which made support of weapon
systems very difficult in the early deployment phases. Thus
it became apparent that greater efforts had to be taken in
all major system acquisitions to give support/logistics
13

planning a more prominent role in the early phases of system
development.
The Navy recognized the need for a more organized approach
when, in 196 3, it issued WR-3 0. This Weapon Requirement was
the first in a succession of documents which for over a decade
have refined and clarified a process in which all support
elements are integrated into a visible total support program
for any major system. This official scheme is called Inte-
grated Logistic Support (ILS).
It is not the intent here to describe ILS and all it en-
compasses. The reader is referred to an ILS overview given
in Appendix A or to any of a number of documents listed in
the Bibliography for that purpose. What is important to
realize, is that GSE was considered to be one of the nine
logistic support elements which, in accordance with the ILS
approach, were to be coordinated and integrated in planning
and implementation by the Assistant Project Manager for
Logistics (APML) on any major NAVAIR project.
PGSE is a unique Integrated Logistic Support element.
Although classified as a support element under the purview
of the Assistant Commander for Logistic/Fleet Support (NAV-
AIR-04), it includes the development and acquisition of
sophisticated hardware under the purview of the Assistant
Commander for Material Acquisition (NAVAIR-05). In turn,
this support equipment requires logistic support by the NAV-
AIR-04 organization. The management of this process is fur-
ther complicated by the necessary time lags between aircraft
1 u

design, PGSE design and PGSE logistic support. The pressures
for fleet introduction become intense when the aircraft wea-
pon system has demonstrated performance. The time lags re-
sult in an interim period in which the aircraft systems can-
not be fully supported in the operational environment. Ad-
verse publicity, because of high Maintenance Man Hours/
Flight Hour and low operational availability, has historical-
ly occurred upon fleet introduction and has given the Navy
an image as poor acquisition managers and has resulted in
Congressional review and direction.
GSE is a significant part of the Life Cycle Cost of an
Aircraft Weapon System and PGSE is a significant part of the
acquisition cost of an aircraft weapon system. In today's
environment of limiting appropriations for defense, the Navy
can no longer afford the high cost of support and low opera-
tional availability that are typical of existing aircraft
weapons systems
.
The relevance of this problem is pointed out in a recent
message to the Chief of Naval Operations from the Commander,
Naval Air Pacific.
Sophisticated avionics systems require equally
advanced State-of-the-Art support equipment. The
methods in which Peculiar Ground Support Equipment
is developed, procured and supported is unsatisfactory.
New aircraft historically arrive in the fleet well in
advance of approved PGSE and are supported by contractor,
work-arounds or by retrograde. As much as five years
has been required to develop, produce, and deliver
avionics GSE [Ref. 2]
As a result of this input, which also includes references to
many other problems, the Chief of Naval Operations has
i q

directed the Chief of Naval Material to form a professional
group to study overall GSE problems with the goal of improv-
ing present policies relative to procurement, provisioning,
and maintenance of Ground Support Equipment [Ref. 3].
Given the budget constraints and command visibility of
support problems, it is being recognized that an acquisi-
tion strategy which focuses primarily on aircraft weapons
system performance is no longer practical. An example of
this trend is the F-18/A-18 project, which was mandated by
Congress when Life Cycle Cost estimates of the F-14 exceeded
20 million dollars while at the same time the aircraft was
experiencing an operational availability of less than M-0%
[Ref. 4-]. The Navy was directed to procure a low cost,
light-weight fighter with design goals of commonality, multi-
mission capability, and high reliability and maintainability
This pressure from Congress and acknowledgement of acquisi-
tion deficiences by the Navy has resulted in an aircraft pro-
curement program that, in the development phases, has made
real trade-offs between performance and supportability and
has contractually incentivized supportability as heavily as
performance
.
B. PURPOSE OF THESIS
With a few notable exceptions, the procedures used and
the organizations involved in the acquisition of PGSE have
evolved and changed gradually since the early days of Inte-
grated Logistic Support in the mid-1960s. It is the purpose
of this thesis to (1) define the basic procedures and
1 K

organizations involved in the PGSE acquisition process, (2)
identify recent trends in changes to these procedures and
organizations, (3) evaluate the current approach as embodied
in the F-18 program, and (4) make recommendations for addi-
tional changes, if appropriate, to further enhance aircraft
support in terms of PGSE.
C. SCOPE OF STUDY
This study focused primarily on those PGSE acquisition
responsibilities and tasks which are encountered in the pre-
deployment phases of a new aircraft program.
1. Procedures
Organizational relationships and managerial respon-
sibilities were the primary subjects of this study. However,
in order to provide a proper perspective, it was also neces-
sary to review the more basic procedures involved. These
basic procedures were those used to ensure that particular
items of PGSE are: (1) appropriate responses to defined main-
tenance requirements, (2) compatible with design requirements
of the aircraft systems and the operational environment, and
(3) scheduled and funded in accordance with a total support
program. These procedures begin with the definition of a
maintenance concept and end with the transfer of support re-
sponsibility from the prime contractor to the Navy. In
general, the step-by-step details of these procedures were




The above procedures involve the participation and
coordination of several divisions in the Logistics/Fleet

Support (NAVAIR-04) and Material Acquisition (NAVAIR-05)
Groups, certain Navy field activities which provide adminis-
trative and technical assistance to those NAVAIR divisions,
and the prime airframe contractor. This study concentrated
on the particular Navy participants in terms of their re-
sponsibilities and interactions, but treated the contractor
as a single participant. The contractor's organizations
were not studied.
D. METHOD OF RESEARCH
This research had its beginnings with term papers by the
authors in three consecutive courses at the Naval Post-
graduate School; Technology Transfer, Procurement Policy
and Production Management. The first two papers provided
broad overviews of the Integrated Logistic Support (ILS)
process and the second concentrated on PGSE. Efforts on
these papers provided a preliminary review of the more
readily-available literature on ILS and PGSE acquisition.
These preliminary efforts were then expanded to a comprehen-
sive examination of the guidelines and implementing instruc-
tions which have resulted in current PGSE acquisition methods
Also reviewed were several technical reports describing air-
craft support problems related to inadequate PGSE, including
two reports of the Naval Audit Service.
After a thorough study of the literature , the authors
conducted a series of personal interviews with Navy and con-
tractor participants, primarily those in the F-18 program.
A list of those interviewed is given in Appendix B. Each

participant interviewed had a fairly well defined role to
play in the PGSE acquisition process which, in most cases,
was somewhat different in the F-18 program than it had been
on prior programs. A general set of key questions was pre-
sented to each interviewee in addition to the more specific
questions relating to the individuals' responsibilities.
These general questions are given in Appendix C.
A conscientious attempt was made to ensure the accuracy
of the descriptions, analyses and conclusions presented in
this thesis. However, time constraints, data collection
methods and the dynamic nature of the subject under study
may have resulted in some misinterpretations. Any errors
should be considered the sole responsibility of the authors





GSE is certainly unique as a support element in the ILS
scheme, in that it is the one element which produces products
which often must be supported by their own comprehensive ILS
programs. As a result, a unique set of GSE acquisition pro-
cedures and organizational arrangements have evolved. A list
of today's traditional Navy participants is given in Table I.
These players will be addressed further following a descrip-
tion of current procedures. The review procedure is intended
to provide little more than a background for the organiza-
tional and managerial reviews which follow.
A. PROCEDURES AND RESPONSIBILITIES
1 . Requirements Definition
Long before a contractor begins submitting proposals
to build the PGSE needed to support a new aircraft, he is
supposed to undertake a fairly well-defined analytical ef-
fort designed to determine logistic support requirements
.
His first step is an agreement with the Navy (the PI1A and
AIR-M-11) as to what the general support philosophy will be
in terms of the aircraft systems and traditional support ap-
proaches. This "Maintenance Concept" provides the guide
for the analytical efforts which must then take place for
each system on the aircraft, as individual system designs
become firm enough for logistic support requirements to be

TABLE I. Navy Participants
Chief of Naval Operations
1. Operational Test and Evaluation Force—evaluate
operational suitability of new systems.
2. Replacement Air Groups— Fleets ' first use of new
system; Fleet training.
Naval Air Systems Command
1. Project Manager ( PMA)-- Primary authority and sole
responsibility for total project management.
2. AIR-410--Provides each major project with an Assis-
tant Project Manager for Logistics (APML)
.
3. AIR-411--Maintenance Engineering Division.
"4. AIR-417— GSE Logistic Support Division.
5. AIR-534—Program Manager for GSE; provides each
major project with an Assistant Project Manager
for GSE.
6. Resident Integrated Logistic Support Detachment
(RILSD)--On-site contractor/Navy ILS coordina-
tion.
Field Activities
1. Naval Air Engineering Center (NAEC ) --managerial and
technical support of AIR-534 and 417.
2. Naval Air Test Center (NATO— technical test and
evaluation
.




identified. By NAVAIRINST 4790. 4A, it is NAVAIR policy
that the Maintenance Plans resulting from these analyses be
used as the bases for the respective systems' logistic
planning efforts [Ref. 5].
Among a variety of Navy and contractor inputs to
the generation of each Maintenance Plan is a Level of Repair
Analysis. Unless there are conflicting arguments from tech-
nical, facilities, training or other areas, this analysis
determines whether a repair capability and the corresponding
need for support equipment is economically sound by compar-
ing estimates of replacement cost, frequency of repair and
cost of repair at each of the three standard maintenance
levels: Organizational (0-level), Intermediate (I-level)
and Depot (D-level). Each Maintenance Plan, when approved
by AIR-411, provides the justification for the contractor to
plan and propose a specific ILS program for that specific
equipment. If the approved plan indicates there is a GSE
requirement, it identifies available common equipment in the
Navy inventory and opens the door for the contractor to pro-
pose PGSE to fill any existing gap.
Typically, 0-level maintenance involves actions analo-
gous to changing the headlights , windshield wipers or battery
on a car and is performed by squadron personnel. I-level
actions are similar to engine tune-ups and it is the more
highly trained and equipped Aviation Intermediate Maintenance
Department (AIMD) on any carrier which handles this level of
work. D-level actions, which are accomplished on shore, get
into the kind of major repair and modification work that
would not be cost-effective at sea or would tie up aircraft
too long, like crash damage repair and major overhaul.
9

2 . Proposal/ Review/Approval
The contractor's proposal for any particular item
of PGSE is in the form of a standardized document entitled
Ground Support Equipment Recommendation Data (GSERD)
.
GSERDs are typically submitted throughout the full-scale
development phase of a major project, with the mechanical
support equipment being proposed earlier than the avionic
test gear. Typically, a GSERD can provide little more than
a functional description of the proposed equipment since
there is usually very little PGSE design work completed at
the time of submittal.
Logistic support requirements for a specific article
of support equipment are also supposed to be defined in its
GSERD. Particularly for the more complex equipment, par-
ticipation is required by the same logistic support elements
as were required in the aircraft development program; e.g.,
technical documents, spare parts, training, facilities and
even more GSE. GSERDs are typically sent via NAVAIR to the
various logistic support planners, technical support groups
when appropriate, and even the NAVAIR representatives in the
Fleet for review and comment. Approval authority rests with
AIR- 5 3 4, the GSE Program Manager, unless it has been dele-
gated to the Naval Air Engineering Center's GSE Department,
where most of the GSERD review is accomplished in any case.
Approval of a GSERD authorizes the Administrative Contract-
ing Officer to negotiate a price with the contractor and re-
quest development to commence. The approved GSERD is also
o o

the "green light" for all logistic support elements involved
to begin their respective efforts for the particular support
item.
3 . Design/Development Testing
The program required to produce an acceptable end-
item of GSE depends on the support gear's complexity. The
more sophisticated items require efforts quite similar to
those which take place for the airborne equipment. These
efforts at the contractor's or subcontractor's plant include
airborne/GSE design liaison, Navy technical monitoring and a
series of design reviews. When the PGSE end-item becomes
available, it is then subjected to technical testing by both
the contractor and, if appropriate, the Naval Air Test Cen-
ter. Depending on when the gear is available, PGSE suitabil-
ity may also be addressed during the aircraft's maintainabil-
ity demonstrations, Operational Test and Evaluation, Board
of Inspection and Survey trials and Fleet introduction with
the Replacement Air Groups.
4-
. Delivery /Deployment
It is during the initial deployment of the aircraft
that the effectiveness of the ILS program is put to the
test. During this period there is always "augmented" support
by the contractor where lead-time requirements have prevented
a full Navy support capability. This transition period is
difficult for most of the support elements since the transi-
tion schedule is, in part, constrained by requirement dates





PGSE's major transition takes place when the Avia-
tion Supply Office (ASO) assumes responsibility for acquisi-
tion and delivery not only for spare parts, but GSE itself.
It is then that the Fleet and other users must rely on ASO '
s
Aircraft Maintenance and Material Readiness List (AMMRL)
program for non-programmable support equipment and on the
Tailored Outfitting List (TOD program maintained by NAEC
for Automatic Test Equipment [Ref. 6].
B. MANAGEMENT STRUCTURE
Concurrent with the increasing sophistication of Navy
aircraft in the late 1950s/early 1960s, was an increasing
awareness that the Navy's logistic support capability was
becoming a critical factor in determining Fleet readiness.
The other services were experiencing similar problems. As
stated earlier, this led to the institution of Integrated
Logistic Support throughout the Department of Defense. It
later became clear to the Navy, however, that GSE problems
were not solvable by the ILS approach alone.
In spite of a policy to rely on multi-purpose GSE rather
than PGSE whenever possible, the Navy was experiencing a
proliferation of numbers and types of GSE required by the
Fleet. In concert with a NAVAIR policy emphasizing the use
of multipurpose equipment, there was a multimillion dollar
major project to develop an automatic test set with an un-
precedented capability to service many different kinds of
avionic systems on several different types of aircraft. The
resultant Versatile Avionics Shop Test (VAST) has been

operational for several years and recent aircraft programs
have been directed to influence aircraft systems design by
emphasizing VAST compatibility.
Clearly, GSE was assuming a role of major importance in
the material acquisition world and, in 1967, NAVAIR recog-
nized this importance by designating the director of the GSE
Division (AIR-534) as the GSE Program Manager, less than one
year after the division's establishment [Ref. 7,8-p.61],
Until 19 76 when Armament, Avionics and Propulsion Program
Managers were established, the GSE Program Manager held the
unique position in NAVAIR of being its only Program Manager.
According to the implementing instruction, the GSE Program
Manager was responsible for "over-all GSE- policy and direc-
tion," resolution of "GSE interface problems between projects"
and ensuring "that all GSE management and functional respon-
sibilities are carried out in a timely manner." In short,
he was to be the ultimate authority for all NAVAIR GSE issues.
Additionally, he was tasked with designating an Assistant
Project Manager for Ground Support Equipment (APM-GSE) for
each major NAVAIR project [Ref. 9],
The prominance of GSE was further enhanced several more
times by the establishment of additional organizations, giv-
ing the GSE program an all-encompassing, semi-autonomous
character normally reserved for weapon system projects.
These further developments were summarized in a 1973 report
on GSE management conducted by the Naval Audit Service.
OK

The GSE Department of NAVAIRENGCEN[NAEC1 was organized
in June 1967 to provide centralized support. The GSE Test
and Evaluation Branch at the Naval Air Test Center
(NAVAIRTESTCEN) was established in August 196 8 to ensure
that comprehensive testing was conducted on all GSE prior
to fleet introduction. The need to consolidate the pre-
viously fragmented GSE logistics management support was
satisfied in March 19 70 by chartering of the GSE Logistics
Division (AIR-417) [Ref. 8-p.61].
With the exception of the organizational approach being
employed by the F-18 program, which will be described in a
later section, the participating organizations and their re-
lationships to one another have remained essentially as im-
plemented seven years ago. A brief review of these relation-
ships is presented in the remainder of this section.
With the somewhat traditional matrix project management
approach to management structure employed by NAVAIR, it is
appropriate to describe the PGSE acquisition participants in
at least two ways: (1) positions in a standard organization
chart, as in Figure 1, and (2) positions in a responsibility
chart for a particular project, as in Figure 2. This descrip-
tion focuses on the NAVAIR organization in which there are
groups headed by Assistant NAVAIR Commanders. The two
groups of direct importance to PGSE acquisition are NAVAIR-0M-,
in which the majority of the Logistic Element Managers (LEMs)
reside, and NAVAIR-05, which is responsible for material
acq/uisition. Simply put, although there are exceptions,
NAVAIR-05 is the engineering community and NAVAIR- 4- is com-
prised of logisticians
.
1. Project Manager (PMA)
Under the project management concept, the PMA is
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X's denote project-dedicated individuals
Figure 2. Project Responsibility

of AIR-01. He is the one individual responsible for ensur-
ing the success of all aspects of the project, including
PGSE acquisition. He receives budget requests from the func-
tional organizations and controls the distribution of the
major part of the appropriated funds. A minor share of the
budgeted dollars become "fenced" in that they go directly to
a Logistic Element Manager, the Aviation Supply Office for
example, without any further accountability to the PMA.
2
.
Assistant Project Manager for Logistics (API1L)
The APML has the responsibility for the coordination
and integration of the logistic support efforts, including
maintenance engineering and PGSE acquisition. He is typical-
ly assigned to his position by AIR-M-10 with concurrence of
the PMA. However, with the exception of the F-18 project,
he has never had any direct authority or funds control with
which to carry out his assigned tasks. Furthermore, AIR-410
is at the same organizational level as the other AIR- 4
divisions and not even in the same group as AIR- 5 34.
3 Class Desk
The assistant project manager for material acquisi-
tion, called the Class Desk Officer, is the AIR-05 analogue
of the APML and is responsible for the acquisition of the
aircraft and its weapons systems. He is assigned to his
position by AIR-510 and does not get involved with AIR-534's
efforts because of his orientation and workload with respect




4. Assistant Project Manager for GSE (APM-GSE)
The APM-GSE, designated by the GSE Program Manager
(AIR- 5 3 4), is responsible for the acquisition of PGSE to
support the project [Ref. 7], Except for the F-18 Program,
the APM-GSE has always made budget submissions to and re-
ceived funding directly from the PMA. Being a LEM, he re-
ceives direction from the APML. In a sense, he also receives
direction from AIR- 411 since it is NAVAIR policy that PGSE
acquisition be initiated only after being identified as a
requirement in an approved airborne system's Maintenance
Plan [Ref. 5]. He also has the distinction of being the




The GSE Logistics Manager is assigned his position
by AIR-417. He is responsible for coordinating and inte-
grating for PGSE, the same support efforts as the APML does
for the airborne systems [Ref. 10]. He typically submits
his budget through the APM-GSE and receives his funds
directly from the PMA.
At this juncture, it is appropriate to restate an
important point. The Logistic Element Managers receive
their direction for PGSE support from the GSE Logistics
Manager. He receives his direction from the APM-GSE. The
APM-GSE receives his direction from the PMA via the APML.
He also is supposed to receive a validated requirement from
AIR-411. All of these individuals, except the APM-GSE and
a few LEMs , reside in AIR-04 divisions of equal organiza-
tional stature and authority. All involved, however, have
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typically received their funding directly from the PMA, re-
gardless of their respective budget review chains.
6
.
Maintenance Policy and Engineering Division
It is the responsibility of AIR-411 to provide over-
all maintenance policy and perform project maintenance en-
gineering [Ref . 11] . Budgets are typically submitted to and
funding received from the PMA directly.
7 Naval Air Engineering Center (NAEC)
The GSE Department of NAEC is tasked with the admin-
istrative and technical support of AIR-534- and AIR-4-17 [Ref.
11]. On any major project, it provides the major contractor/
NAVAIR interface for PGSE acquisition and support. It bud-
gets to and receives funds from both AIR-53M- and AIR-4-17 for
work tasks in the respective areas.
8. Naval Air Test Center (NATO
It is the responsibility of the GSE Test and Evalua-
tion Branch of NATC to technically evaluate items of GSE
prior to Fleet introduction [Refs. 10, 11]. It typically
budgets to and receives funds from AIR-534- for this purpose.
9 Resident Integrated Logistic Support Detachment
(RILSD)
The RILSD, located at the contractor's facility, is
typically made up of a small number of individuals. From a
variety of home organizations , they are on detail to the
Navy or Air Force Plant Representative, as the case may be.
Their relatively informal interface with the contractor
serves a multi-function, time-saving role in the support
planning, design and submission/approval areas [Ref. 12].
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The RILSD is headed by a director who reports to the
APML.
10. Aviation Supply Office (ASO)
ASO is responsible for PGSE acquisition and spares
support after the so-called Material Support Date [Ref. 10].
Prior to that date, NAEC is responsible for the GSE and GSE
spares provisioning. ASO, to some degree, is involved even
in the early stages of the project in order to ensure a
smooth transition from NAEC's "augmented" support to the
operational Navy support programs. The one exception, men-
tioned earlier, is that NAEC never does transition Automatic
Test Equipment (ATE) responsibility to ASO. ASO's initial
support for a major project is budgeted for by the PMA, but
the funds do not come to the project office. ASO is located
in and is funded through the Naval Supply Command.
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III. THE F-18 APPROACH
At this point, emphasis is shifted from a general de-
scription of PGSE acquisition management to look at how a
particular current project is accomplishing PGSE acquisition.
In outlining the F-18 approach to PGSE acquisition the lar-
ger context of the F-18 approach to aircraft acquisition be-
comes the principal topic of discussion. The changes in PGSE
acquisition are really embodied in the overall acquisition
strategy of the F-18 project. The major changes in approach
can be grouped as follows
:
1) Early planning for support
2) Phased Support
3) NARF NORIS Logistic Support Team
M- ) Support management
The definition and implementation of these concepts will be
covered in terms of changes in organizations, organizational
interactions and procedures. In most cases the discussion
will attempt to limit itself to areas having direct impact
on PGSE acquisition, although related elements will neces-
sarily be addressed where essential for the sake of complete-
ness and understanding.
It should also be recognized that some of these concepts
are not really new; they are incremental changes from prior
major aircraft procurement procedures. These incremental
changes can take the form of establishing a desirable
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procedure earlier in the acquisition process or simply ack-
nowledging an existing informal way of doing business.
A. EARLY PLANNING FOR SUPPORT
Early planning for support seems like a straightforward
concept that would occur on all programs. The depth of the
commitment to early support planning in the project office
was apparently a second order concern on many projects. A
quote by the F-18 APML is enlightening.
It seems in past programs logistics received little
PMA attention until fleet introduction. The major area
of PMA concern was the design and performance of the
aircraft. This trend has been reversed in the F-18 pro-
gram. PMA-26 5 is keenly aware of the importance of de-
tailed planning and integration of logistics from the
beginning of the program [Ref. 13].
The F-18 Full Scale Development Contract has 29 million
dollars of incentives divided between performance and sup-
port. In the support area the incentive is split between
predeployment support demonstrations and post-deployment
support demonstrations. The final incentive award depends
on actual fleet experience during the first year of deploy-
ment. Adequate PGSE is a significant factor in the contrac-
tor's ability to meet the contractual cost and support per-
formance requiremenrs . For the first time part of the con-
tractors fee will depend on how well the PGSE performs in
the fleet environment.
The commitment to support on the Navy side is evidenced
by the number of organizations and people active in the
early stages of the program. The F-18 is the first aircraft
procurement that has a specification in the contract for an
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Aircraft Maintenance Plan Analysis. The resulting Mainten-
ance Plans for individual aircraft systems are considered
the integrating documents for aircraft support. Personnel
from the Naval Air Rework Facility at North Island (NARF
NORIS) have been tasked to assist NAVAIR-411 in the review
of Maintenance Plans. The Maintenance Plan is the docuineni
that defines the need for GSE. Without a Maintenance Plan
defining that need, a GSERD for an item of PGSE will prob-
ably be rejected by the APML. However, there is a mechanism
for submittal of early GSERD' s for GSE in response to obvious
needs (e.g., mechanical PGSE such as slings, jack stands,
etc. )
.
Also, based on Reliability and Maintainability predic-
tions which emanate from weapon system design, those systems
which are expected to constitute the bulk of the work load
at Intermediate level have been assigned first priority for
analysis and development of fleet maintenance capability.
This is basically a philosophy of concentrating resources
on the hard problems first and making sure that the small
percentage of systems that cause the majority of problems
are supported in depth [Ref. 14] . This philosophy should
have significant impact on the selection and design of PGSE.
Another example of the commitment to support is the
early establishment of the Resident Integrated Logistics
Support Detachment (RILSD), at the contractors plant, 30
days after Full Scale Development contract award. This RILSD
had, for the first time, a full-time member responsible for
GSE. The charter of the RILSD includes [Ref. 12]:
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1. Ensure that all system specifications include GSE
requirements
.
2. Assist in determining the existence of suitable GSE.
3. Review GSERDs for compliance with Maintenance Plans.
M- . Monitor GSE design, development, test, evaluation,
and production.
5. Monitor contractor performance related to GSE sup-
port.
The RILSD GSE expert is from NAEC, the NAVAIR-534 field
activity for technical support. In addition NAEC has been
tasked to supply a GSE member from the appropriate specialty
area to attend weapon system design reviews, monitor first
article PGSE tests and attend Contractor Maintenance Engi-
neering Inspections. NAEC has been delegated approval
authority on all F-18 GSERD's. This delegation is expected
to reduce GSERD processing time by a few weeks. NAEC will
also implement a computerized program to allow tracking of
GSE status. This program was developed during the late
stages of the F-1M- projecr.
Another first on the F-18 project is a contractual re-
quirement for a Reliability and Maintainability Master Plan
specifically for PGSE. Flexibility is included to allow
tailoring the Reliability and Maintainability Plan to the
PGSE. An evaluation is made of each PGSE item in terms of
use, complexity, cost, and importance to mission success.
If it is determined that the PGSE item is a high use, com-
plex or expensive item and considered program critical,
the Reliability and Maintainability candidate blocks will
be marked "yes" on the Summary Requirements List which is
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attached to the GSERD. This attachment specifies the quan-
titative requirements , the testing required to verify com-
pliance with the specifications and a cost estimate for the
Reliability and Maintainability Plan as tailored for the
particular piece of GSE in question. The PGSE Reliability
and Maintainability program is a comprehensive program in-
cluding the subcontractor level and contains a well-defined
data collection, analysis, corrective action, and reporting
system [Ref . 15 ]
.
B. PHASED SUPPORT
Under the F-13 concept of phased support, contractor sup-
port will continue until such time as the designs of the var-
ious systems involved have been stabilized, the support
equipment is Fleet-configured, and the Navy is capable of
performing the required maintenance. Phased support recog-
nizes that full Navy support cannot be attained on a single
anticipated date. In the F-18 program the Navy will require
that the support system must demonstrate proper operation
before the Navy will assume repair responsibility. The con-
tractor will perform maintenance with production test equip-
ment in a fleet environment to fulfill this requirement
[Ref. 16]
.
The contractor will use Factory Test Equipment during
his flight test program and will evaluate this test equip-
ment for proper operation and fleet utility. The contractor
will also use this test equipment to perform maintenance
during Initial Operational Test and Evaluation. The
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contractor will deliver Production 0-level GSE prior to
Board of Inspection and Survey (BIS) trials. During BIS
the Navy will perform the necessary O-level maintenance
and the contractor will perform I-level and D-level main-
tenance with most non-avionic I-level maintenance accom-
plished with Production GSE.
The first operational squadron will have full 0-level
capability, full non-avionic I-level capability and will be
in the process of achieving avionic Weapon Replaceable
2 . . . .Assembly (WRA) I-level capability. Avionic System Replace-
3
able Assembly (SRA) I-level capability and D-level capa-
bility will phase in over the two years following introduc-
tion of the first operational squadron [Ref. 17]. Figure 3
is a diagram of the proposed F-18 Phased Support chronology.
C. NARF NORIS LOGISTIC SUPPORT TEAM
Phased Support, discussed in the preceding section, re-
quires the support system to mature at the same rate, although
delayed in time, as the aircraft functional system design.
In order to accomplish this it is necessary to manage the sup-
port system development by aircraft functional categories.
Since there are almost 50 functional systems on the F-18 it
would be inefficient to assign a man to manage the logistic
2Weapons Replaceable Assembly (WRA) : a system or system
component that can be faulr-isolated and replaced at the
Organizational level of Maintenance.
3 Shop Replaceable Assembly (SRA) : Subsystems or components
of a WRA that can be fault-isolated and replaced/repaired at





















































































































































support of each one. The functional systems have been con-
solidated into nine groups as shown in Appendix D. The
systems comprising each group are similar in the sense that
they are compatible in engineering requirements and in neces-
sary educational background and experience of the designers.
They also agree with the categorization of work centers in
OPNAVINST 4790. 2A at the organizational and intermediate
levels of maintenance [Ref. 16].
Figure 4 is an abbreviated chart to help in visualizing
the concept. In each of the nine functional areas one man
would be responsible for coordinating all the applicable
logistics elements. As is presently the case, the NAVAIR
LEMS would still be technically cognizant of their respective
logistic elements across the functional groups.
The NARF NORIS Logistic Support Team has been organized
to provide technical support to the APML in coordinating the
ILS elements in each functional group [Ref. 18] . For example,
the LEM for PGSE (APM-GSE) could have many different de-
livery dates for PGSE depending on the functional aircraft
system each item is to support. The APM-GSE has the ability
to make cost, performance and schedule tradeoffs between
various items of PGSE. However, he does not have the visi-
bility to make tradeoffs with publications, training or
spares. These higher order tradeoffs can only be made by
the APML after a problem in a functional group (either de-
sign or support) has been brought to the APML's attention














































































































































Thus, the ability to manage the Phased Support concept
rests on the ability of the Logistic Support Team to accom-
plish its technical monitoring and coordinating responsi-
bility.
D. SUPPORT MANAGEMENT
On the F-18 project, the APML is considered a manager.
Along with the traditional responsibility of coordinating
the weapon system support, the APML has been given a much
greater role in making support tradeoffs and controlling
the funds to the support elements. The F-18 project is the
first project in which the APML has been in the funds flow
chain from the PMA to the LEMs
.
The whole theme of F-18 support management is that plans
are going to drive the system rather than allowing the sys-
tem to evolve and then fix problems in a crisis environment.
Managing the process requires recognizing the characteris-
tics of the system and evolving plans around these character-
istics. One of the characteristics recognized is that all
support equipment cannot be ready on the same date. This
leads to the Phased Support Plan which requires management
by functional group. Tradeoffs between functional groups
or logistic elements requires the data provided by the Logis-
tic Support Team. Control of the funding by the APML allows
him to implement necessary adjustments to the support struc-
ture. This systematic approach to the F-18 support develop-
ment is an indication of the greater emphasis and visibility




Central issues in discussing the relevance of PGSE ac-
quisition management are the visibility of the subject, the
problems that exist and the organizational environment in
which the PGSE acquisition is accomplished. Any conclusions
and recommendations must address real problems to achieve
usefulness beyond interests of an academic nature. The visi-
bility must also exist in order to expect any changes to be
implemented.
PGSE acquisition, under the umbrella of Integrated Logis-
tics Support, has had a logical methodology since the promul-
gation of AR-30 in 196 4. However, the promises of this
methodology have not been realized to any great extent. Sys-
tems introduced into the fleet during the late 60 ' s and early
70 's have been plagued with problems that have existed for
many years and additional problems have appeared due to the
sophistication of Automatic Test Equipment. The PGSE opera-
tional problems included poor PGSE configuration control,
design inadequacy, useless and unwanted gear, late delivery
and inadequate training, publications and spares. Poor sup-
port performance resulted in low aircraft operational avail-
ability and, in addition, escalating operation and maintenance
costs have combined to give this topic a great deal of visi-
bility [Refs. 4, 8, 19, 20]. Many of these support
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performance problems were the result of poor acquisition
management in the early phases of a project.
The traditional image of the support function in the en-
gineering world is one of an unglamorous profession that
attracted second-rate personnel. The design and acquisition
of aircraft weapon systems has always been from a perform-
ance oriented approach. Project managers, and their superi-
ors, have typically come from the fighter pilot, white-scarf-
flying-in- the-wind , school. This orientation is understand-
able and desirable since obviously an aircraft must perform
in order to successfully accomplish the assigned mission.
However this attitude led to insufficient early, tough plan-
ning for support and any funding problems that occurred in
the aircraft development were resolved by cutting some ele-
ment of support. The typical philosophy was: If the aircraft
meets the performance requirements, money to solve the sup-
port problems will be made available.
This climate began to change in the early 70 ' s when Con-
gress cut F-14 procurement due to high life cycle costs and
low availability. The realization that the performance-at-
all-costs orientation has changed has been slowly filter-
ing into the NAVAIR organizations. Any change will meet
opposition, but a change elevating the nonglamorous support
function to equal tradeoff status with performance is , for
want of a better word, traumatic.
In PGSE acquisition, problems exist, the issue is visible
and management and procedural changes are occurring. This
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discussion section is concerned with the evolution and ade-
quacy of this change toward correcting existing deficiencies.
A. PGSE ACQUISITION MANAGEMENT
The F-18 Program has taken some positive steps to avoid
the support problems which have persisted despite prior pro-
ject's efforts at improving the situation. Because the F-18
approach involved some methods which were distinctly differ-
ent from the traditional ones , there was significant initial
resistance from the functional NAVAIR divisions, particularly
those under the direction of the F-18 APML. The resistance
within AIR-04, given the logic of the F-18 approach, has all
but subsided. There is, however, a substantial area of con-
flict still in existence between the F-18 APML and AIR-534.
On the surface, the issue is one of who has the authority to
control PGSE funds from the F-18 PMA. Analysis reveals that
deeper, more basic issues are also involved. These issues
range from a question of categorizing PGSE as a material
acquisition function or a logistic support function to the
question of how much authority the GSE Program Manager has
over a particular project's PGSE efforts.
The funds control issue will be discussed at greater
length in a later section analyzing the F-18 approach. The
related, more basic PGSE issues are organizational by nature
and will be addressed first.
1 . Basic Organizational Issues
a. Project Management
Both NAVAIR and aerospace contractors have de-
veloped ways of operating with a project management type of
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organization. While there is no intent here to discuss all
of the virtues and shortcomings of project management, it
will be necessary to review some of the organizational prin-
ciples before getting into the particular PGSE issues.
(1) Contractor . In the aerospace industry, a
typical contractor's organization chart looks something like
that in Figure 5. Under the general manager there are
basically two kinds of organizations; project teams and
functional groups. The project managers are totally respon-
sible for the successful design, development, production and
sale of their respective products. They are given authority
by higher management commensurate with that responsibility.
Project team members, numbering as few as a half-dozen in
most cases , are transferred to the team from their parent
functional organizations. As a team member, an individual
is responsible to the project manager, not to his respective
functional organization. A functional manager retains respon-
sibility for the quality of his organization's contribution
to a project, but has almost no authority on project matters
In spite of detailed sets of guidelines, active conflict be-
tween project managers and functional heads is unavoidable
because of their inherently different motivations. J. M.
Stewart, in his article "Making Project Management Work,"
suggests that short-term conflicts [project-specific issues]
can often be resolved in favor of the project manager and
long-term conflicts [company policy] in favor of the func-




















































































































(2) NAVAIR . The NAVAIR approach to project
management is shown in Figure 6. While basically similar
to the contractor's, it is different in several important
respects. It will be seen that these differences have the
potential for significant impact on the PGSE acquisition
environment.
The first difference to recognize is the
potential in the military organization for an individual's
rank to impact his ability to function as a particular
player, e.g. a project manager. When NAVAIR set up its pro-
ject management structure, it had to be cognizant of the
military tradition of equating authority with rank in a
simple, rigidly enforced hierarchical structure. This fac-
tor was alluded to by the Comptroller General in a report
to Congress in 1971:
"In general, the military services have not deemed it
wise to place the project manager high in the organiza-
tion because of some practical considerations, such as
the large number of project managers and the need for
them to work directly at lower levels of the organiza-
tion" [Ref . 22]
.
By comparison to the industrial case, the
heads of NAVAIR' s functional organizations wield a lot of
authority and are quite capable of influencing individual
project's operations. In fact, they are admirals, and PMAs
are typically captains. Division heads are also captains
while the APML and Class Desk are typically commanders.
Also, in contrast to the typical industrial project organi-
zation, Figure 6 shows how the project's functional repre-




































































































Again, there is no intent here to evaluate
the logic of the NAVAIR project management structure other
than to point out how it is different from industrial pro-
ject management and how that difference affects the PGSE ac-
quisition environment. The main point that has been made
is that a project team's functional representatives, the
Class Desk and the APML , remain organizationally in line to
their respective functional heads, admirals, rather than to
the PMA, usually a captain.
b. Project/Program Proliferation
One major aspect of NAVAIR' s business with which
the management structure must contend is the number of dif-
ferent systems acquisition programs in existence at any one
time, only a few of which have project status [Ref. 22].
Many of these non-project programs are large enough to cut
across division lines and are managed by personnel in AIR-510,
assisted by logistics coordinators from AIR-410. There are
also programs confined to the technologies of individual
divisions which are managed by their own personnel. Also,
AIR- 410 and AIR-510 provide managers/coordinators for pro-
grams and functional members for project teams.
In this thesis the term project manager is used
consistently to indicate the manager of a major acquisition
4-
Project status is usually reserved for major programs
having an estimated RDTSE cost in excess of $75 million,
or an estimated production cost in excess of $300 million.
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program that is organizationally outside the functional dis-
ciplines. The term program manager is used to indicate the
manager of an acquisition program that is organizationally
within a functional discipline. Project/program manager con-
flict with functional organizations is inevitable and the
addition of project manager conflict with program managers,
who are backed by functional organizations, adds another dimen-
sion that can have some serious consequences. The impact of
the two types of program management on PGSE acquisition man-
agement will be addressed further when alternatives to the
present organizational structure are presented,
c. Functional Authority
The term "functional authority" refers to that
authority of heads of functional organizations, delegated
from upper management, to determine company-wide policies
and procedures in their respective areas of expertise and re-
quire company-wide adherence. As typical industrial examples,
this type of authority is usually given to accounting and
personnel departments. According to Xoonty and O'Donnell in
their book "Principals of Management," the limit of any func-
tional authority must be very carefully and explicitly
stated in order to minimize project/functional area conflict
[Ref. 21, pp. 4-76-485]. The reasons for granting functional
authority are standardization and continuity of company
policy in those areas where these requirements are requisite
to effectiveness. Engineering design, prototyping methods,
test scheduling, etc., usually do not fit into this category.
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Depending in part on the stature of a particular project,
conflict between a project and an engineering organization
is usually decided in favor of the project. This process
works well in an industrial organization where programs are
few in number and the company is not required to operate
and maintain every product it produces.
In the Navy, however, engineering decisions are
often less project-specific. For example, in contrast to
the few projects of a typical contractor, NAVAIR has many
programs and projects but only one Aviation Intermediate
Maintenance Department (AIMD) on a carrier which has to sup-
port the end products. Many such examples could be cited
in evidence of the greater need for standardization and
commonality. In essence, they all boil down to the fact
that the Navy manages many different system acquisitions for
which it is the end-user. If each program and project were
given a free hand in directing the functional participants
,
chaos in the Fleet would certainly result. Thus, a logical
reason exists for having program managers within a func-
tional organization.
There are currently four material acquisition
divisions which have the distinction of being headed by
chartered program managers: Armament (AIR-532), Avionics
(AIR-533), GSE (AIR-534) and Propulsion (AIR-536) [Ref. 9].
These program managers wield a great deal of authority in
their respective areas. According to NAVAIRNOTE 540 0,
dated 21 April 1976, "Program Managers have authority to
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short-cut normal chain-of- command lines and to direct efforts
of functional groups throughout NAVi\IR HO, as required, for
the successful implementation of system efforts." A short
history of what led up to this authority being given to the
head of AIR-53M- was given in an earlier section. Thus,
these Program Mangers have "functional authority" in their
area of expertise not unlike that of an industrial organiza-
tion. The interesting aspect of this authority is that it
applies the long-term stabilizing influence of functional
authority to engineering disciplines which are dynamic and
require technological innovation. The destabilizing influence
is the short tenure of the military officers heading these
divisions which tends to make long term policy change every
few years.
d. Conflict Resolution
The management effectiveness of any organization
often depends on the ease with which its design allows for
conflict resolution. As noted earlier, the hierarchical
structure of military rank and the degree to which functional
authority is delegated creates a difficult environment for
PGSE acquisition. NAVAIR upper management has recognized
that, in spite of a preponderance of logical, consistent
charters and implementing directives, informal problem reso-
lution will likely be more difficult between program and
project managers than between other division heads and pro-
ject managers. NAVAIRNOTE 5400 directed that, "Should dis-
agreement arise it will be brought promptly to the attention
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of the Deputy Commander and Assistant Commanders as appro-
priate for resolution" [Ref. 9].
e. PGSE Alignment
NAVAIRINST 5400.18, the GSE Program Manager's
charter, also created some unique positions within AIR-534;
those of the Assistant Project Managers for GSE (APM-GSEs).
It is important to recognize the significance of the fact
that the term "Assistant Project Manager" is used in the
position title rather than any other selection of words.
Since, on any project, the Class Desk and the APML are the
two assistant project managers, for material acquisition and
logistic support, respectively, it would appear that the in-
struction intended to give the APM-GSE a position of unique
stature relative to a project's other Logistic Element Mana-
gers. An APM-GSE is a senior individual in AIR-5 34 and has,
in the past, had a relatively free hand in directing a pro-
ject's PGSE program. While required to be responsive to the
PMA, an APM-GSE 's title suggests that he need only coordinate
his efforts with those of the Class Desk and the APML. This
position was echoed to some extent by AIR-534 personnel dur-
ing the authors' interviews in spite of the general instruc-
tions in NAVAIRINST 5400.18 that the APM-GSE "will be re-
sponsive to" the Class Desk and the APML. The lack of a
clear division of responsibility seems to be substantial and
will tend to cause unnecessary conflict between project
management and AIR- 5 3 4.
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2 . GSE Decision Tree
Given the organizational and political environment,
it is instructive to pause and reflect on the nature of PGSE
acquisition with respect to the total aircraft/weapon system
program and on possible alternative management structure and
responsibilities. The decision tree in Figure 7 is provided
to illustrate several alternatives and facilitate the discus-
sions in this section.
a. Nature of GSE
Figure 7 indicates that, even at the most basic
level of classification, an alternative exists for GSE.
(1) Prime Subsystem . One could argue, particu-
larly since there are substantial CGSE programs today, that
all GSE should be regarded no differently than any other
major aircraft system. Airborne systems must be designed to
interface with one another much in the same way as with sup-
port equipment, the real difference being the operational
environment, not equipment sophistication nor required engi-
neering efforts
.
Under this option, the Class Desk would con-
trol PGSE acquisition efforts in the same manner as those
efforts are controlled for the other AIR-05 divisions. Note
that all four of the AIR-0 5 "program managers" would then co-
ordinate with and be responsive to AIR-510. ILS for PGSE and
CGSE would be provided by AIR-M-10 in the same way as it is
provided for the airborne systems on any program or project.











































































that it would not be subject to funding cutbacks and lack
of early planning that have been typical for logistic sup-
port elements in the past.
(2) Support Element . There are also arguments
for continuing to consider GSE to be an element of ILS. An
obvious one is that if the airborne systems were 100 percent
reliable there would be no need for most GSE which, there-
fore, is certainly support by nature. Also, requirements
for airborne systems are in response to Operational Require-
ments, while GSE requirements originate in Maintenance Plans
which are a support function. It is also true that the kind
of high-level support emphasis that currently exists will
make it much more difficult to trade-off the quality of the
support program for additional aircraft as has been done in
the past.
Perhaps the most convincing argument in
favor of leaving PGSE under the control of APML is the prac-
tical consideration that the Class Desk does not have the
same inclination as the APML to be concerned with it. AIR-
510 is responsible for coordinating and integrating the ac-
quisition of airborne systems and must devote full attention
to total airborne system considerations: system performance,
power requirements, air conditioning requirements, packaging,
weight, etc. GSE does not fit into this primary concern for
airborne systems and there is no reason to expect the Class
Desk to do a better job than the APML of managing GSE acqui-
sition. For this reason, the decision tree in Figure 7 con-
tinues to look at GSE only as a support element.
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b. Location of GSE
Once the decision is made that PGSE is an ILS
element under the direction of an APML, one must decide
whether the acquisition responsibility belongs in AIR-04 or
AIR- 05. The assumption throughout is that PGSE and CGSE
would be impossible to organizationally separate, nor would
it even be desirable because of the required interfaces and
the overall responsibility of the GSE Program Manager. How-
ever, it is in the PGSE acquisition process that the organi-
zational issues can become critical. Therefore, although
the discussions which follow relate directly to project ef-
fectiveness in terms of the PMA/APML/APM-GSE/AIR-417 manage-
ment structure, any organizational conclusions must -apply to
the AIR-5 34 division as a whole.
(1) NAVAIR-04 . If the GSE acquisition responsi-
bility were in the AIR- 4 group, in concert with its support
nature, there would be a more efficient line of authority
for resolution of conflict. Eor problems not solvable at the
project/GSE Division level, the next higher level of negotia-
tion would be between the Deputy Commander for Plans and
Programs (AIR-01) and the Assistant Commander for Logistics/
Fleet Support (AIR- 4-)
,
which is similar to the present situ-
ation. However, conflicts between the APML and the GSE Divi-
sion could be resolved by AIR- 4- and not require negotiation
between AIR-04 and AIR-05 or a decision by higher authority.
Of course, rhe GSE Program Manager could appeal to the Com-
mander on appropriate issues , as is authorized by his charter,
The potential for conflict and difficulty of resolution,
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which currently exists , would certainly not disappear with
a simple organizational change, but after a period of adjust-
ment there would likely be an improved, more effective work-
ing relationship between the GSE Division and the other 04
divisions. Problems would tend to be worked out at a lower
informal level and a more consistent application of support
philosophy could be expected.
(a) APML Location. The locations of the
Logistic Element Managers (LEMs) is a factor in determining
whether or not the APML should be located in the PMA's office
with a PMA-XXXX code. With the GSE Division in the AIR-04
Group, then all of the PGSE acquisition participants would
be organizationally tied to AIR-04- . The advantages of having
the APML in AIR- 4-10 would then be in terms of speedier, in-
formal "horizontal" relationships. This very practical
matter came to light more than once in the authors' inter-
views: For tasks as simple and straightforward as processing
purchase requests, the NAVAIR functional organizations seem
to be more responsive to one of "their own". The APML in AIR-
410 would also be closer to his sources of information and
could more closely monitor adherence to project guidelines.
Informal interaction during planning and budgeting activities
,
for example, can lead to a much better product and a greater
commitment by the participants to meet project goals.
(b) AIR-4-17 Requirement. A review of
Figures 1 and 2 reveals two organizations, of division status
in AIR-04, which have similar responsibilities. Both AIR-410
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and AIR-417 are "logistics management" divisions. A study
of whether there actually are sufficient reasons for this
seemingly proliferative management structure was beyond
the scope of this thesis. However, if the GSE (acquisition)
Division were in AIR- 4, there would probably be a greater
opportunity for eliminating this additional ILS function.
Either the GSE Division could absorb the AIR- 11 7 function
by creating a "Logistics Branch" or, with the improved rela-
tions between GSE and AIR-410, such a branch could be estab-
lished in AIR-mo.
(2) NAVAIR-0 5 . The previous discussion reviewed
the possible organizational impact of recognizing PGSE acqui-
sition for what it is , a support function, and locating the
division under AIR- 04-. However, when traditional bureau-
cratic politics and professional attitudes are recognized as
the powerful considerations that they are, then the question
as to the GSE Division's appropriate location becomes very
difficult. For some of the same reasons cited in support of
improved ILS in the earlier AIR-04 section, the location of
the GSE Division in AIR- 5 probably better facilitates the
required airborne equipment/GSE design interface; i.e.,
through effective informal interactions. It is also a fact
that the AIR-04 and AIR-05 communities do not hold each other
in very high professional regard. In particular, it might
be difficult for an electronics engineer to consider himself
a logistician were a transfer to AIR- 4 to take place. In-
terestingly enough, if a transfer of the GSE Division is not
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feasible for these practical reasons, then the two questions
addressed earlier concerning the APML and AIR-M-17 take on
a greater significance and lead to opposite conclusions.
(a) APML Location. The GSE Division is
certainly one of the more major participants in an ILS pro-
gram. If the GSE Division cannot be moved out of AIR-0 5,
then serious consideration should be given to moving the
APML up to the PMA's office. The F-18 Project has exper-
ienced particular difficulty with the present organizational
structure. As long as the APML is tasked with controlling
the project efforts of organizations which are not within
AIR-0M-, he might need the stature of a PMA code in getting
the required functional response. This type of question
tends to get down to the level of individual personalities
and projects, which cannot really be pursued here. However,
it may be generally true that under these circumstances,
the loss of informal speed and sources of information cited
earlier can be more than compensated for by the increased
stature and resulting apparent authority of an APML located
in the project office.
(b) AIR-M-17 Requirement. Again, it is
not possible here to consider the pros and cons of estab-
lishing a branch in AIR- 4 10 to provide ILS for GSE. However
that function must certainly be provided by an AIR-04 divi-
sion. There's very little logic to a logistics branch in




GSE, and particularly PGSE, was found to be an
element of support within the framework of ILS. There seemed
to be a mixture of theoretical and practical arguments both
for and against transferring AIR-5 34 into the AIR- 4 Group.
Questions were addressed as to the appropriate location of
the APML and the requirement for a separate logistics manage-
ment division for GSE. The answers to the latter two ques-
tions depended quite strongly on whether the GSE Division
was in AIR- 4 or AIR-0 5.
B. F-18 APPROACH
The F-18 approach to PGSE acquisition will be discussed
using the background of the acquisition environment discus-
sion and the description of the F-18 approach from Section
III.
Figure 3 is an organizational structure chart that has
been put together from relationships defined in F-18 docu-
mentation and discussions with almost all of the organiza-
tional elements listed on the chart. Such a diagram is
necessary to discuss the F-18 approach and a studied attempt
has been made, on the basis of available information, to de-
pict the major interactions accurately. However, it is the
authors' interpretarion and is not an official chart.
The basic philosophy of the F-18 approach to support is
that the F-18 project is going to control the support environ-
ment rather than support problems controlling the project
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than "reactive" approach to management and is always a worth-
while goal.
The necessary ingredients to implement this philosophy
are contained in four goals expressed by the APML:
1. Project office is equally incentivized for cost effec-
tive support as well as a cost effective weapons system.
2. APML is recognized as a manager charged with ensuring
the support of the weapons system.
3. Recognize there are risks in the support function as
well as in the weapon system and plans must be made and con-
tingencies set aside for these risks.
4
.
Require a firm commitment from the functional organi-
zations to do tasks as assigned by the PMA.
The project office commitment to support as well as air-
craft performance is evident from considering the environment
that created the F-18 program, the incentives for support
performance in the weapon system contract and the strong role
assigned to the APML for support management. Given that the
first goal has been accomplished, the accomplishment of the
remaining three goals can provide a rationale for judging
the potential effectiveness of the F-18 approach to PGSE
acquisition.
1. APML Control
The stature of the APML position on the F-18 project
is one of the greatest changes from prior projects. Comparing
Figure 8 with Figure 2 on page 29 gives an indication of the
magnitude of this change. Another point about the chart in
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Figure 8 is that an Integrated Logistic Support Management
Team is not shown. The F-18 Integrated Logistics Support
Plan states; "The primary management vehicle of the ILS pro-
gram is the Integrated Logistics Support Management Team
which serves to monitor and control the execution of overall
program requirements" [Ref. 17]. The Integrated Logistics
Support Management Team still exists on paper but, for all
practical purposes, the "monitor" function is now done by
the Logistic Support Team and the "control" function is
accomplished by the APML.
The increases in the stature of the APML have resulted
in corresponding apparent decreases in the stature of the
GSE Program Manager and Logistic Element Manager functions.
In terms of responsibilities and job content this reduction
in stature has not really occurred; it is only relative to
the APML position that the change has occurred.
The chief difference from past programs for the GSE
Program Manager and other Logistic Element Managers is that
the PMA has delegated some of his traditional authority to
the APML who occupies a position in NAVAIR-M-10. Given the
other demands on the PMA, it is unrealistic to expect him to
be able to deal with functional program managers and Logistic
Element Managers in enough detail to ensure that support is
really proceeding as he has broadly outlined it in project
plans and the maintenance concept. This delegation to the
APML brings the AIR- 04 side of the house to the same point
that the Class Desk function has occupied on the AIR-05 side
of the house for some time.
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The primary method of implementing this change in
stature of the APML has been by giving him funds control.
The "Golden Rule" is widely accepted as a primary precept
almost without question. Assumption of total reliance on
this precept, however, can be misleading.
Changes have occurred in the control and coordina-
tion of support elements as a result of giving the APML
funds control and charging him with support management but
these changes have not been accomplished as easily as the
project would desire. This problem of implementing changes
has been recognized for some time, as a quote from a book
written in 1961 illustrates.
Personal behavior patterns are frequently encountered
which exaggerate the characteristic qualities of bureau-
cratic organization. Within bureaucracy we often find ex-
cessive aloofness, rirualistic attachment to routines and
procedures, and resistance to change; and associated with
these behavior patterns is a petty insistence upon rights
of authority and status. From the standpoint of organi-
zational goal accomplishment, these personal behavior
patterns are pathological because they do not advance
organizational goals. They reflect the personal needs of
individuals [Ref. 21, p. 405].
The logic of the F-18 approach to support management
seems consistent with the goals of the F-18 project. How-
ever, more attention paid to informal organizational behavior
aspects during implementation of the necessary APML control
functions would probably have reduced some of the resistance
The "Golden Rule" stated succinctly is: He who has the
gold, makes the rules. Everyone the authors interviewed
were familiar with this rule and seemed to accept it explicitly
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to these changes. The end result of this segment of the
discussion is that the APML might be viewed as the support
manager by his superiors but the same is not generally true
of those subject to his control.
2 . Program Managers/Logistic Element Managers
As the GSE Program Manager, NAVAIR-5 34 has occupied
a unique position among the Logistic Element Managers on
prior projects. Funds were received directly from the PMA
and self-approved GSERDS were the documentation for control-
ling PGSE acquisition. On the F-18 project, funds are re-
ceived through the APML in NAVAIR-410, and approved Mainten-
ance Plans from NAVAIR-411 are required before any PGSE
acquisition can occur.
Two specific issues related to PGSE acquisition have
been raised by NAVAIR-5 34 in questioning these NAVAIR-04 con-
trols. The firsr issue is that waiting for an approved
Maintenance Plan delays GSE acquisition. Timely delivery of
GSE is one of the primary concerns of NAVAIR-5 34. Related
to this concern is the fact that NAVAIR-5 34 has received un-
expected funding cutbacks on prior programs and, therefore,
believes in obligating funds as soon as possible. The second
issue revolves around the implementation of Phased Support.
The APML believes the use of Factory Test Equipment for main-
tenance until the functional aircraft system design has
matured is the most cost-effective approach. NAVAIR-534
maintains that fleet configured PGSE should be developed
as soon as possible and then modified along with the aircraft
Kfl

system by Engineering Change Proposals as the aircraft sys-
tem matures. NAVAIR-53M- believes early use of fleet con-
figured PGSE allows an earlier transition to Navy support
and Engineering Change Proposals usually have a minor impact
on PGSE and are consequently inexpensive. A related Phased
Support issue is the NAVAIR-534 view that all identified
PGSE should be developed as quickly as possible rather than
following the F-18 plan of concentrating on the PGSE for low-
reliability systems first. Again, the NAVAIR-5 3 4 viewpoint
of committing funds as quickly as possible and delivery of
GSE as quickly as possible comes through.
From the viewpoint of project management prerogatives,
discussed in the section on project management, these issues
are of a short-term project nature and are decisions the APML
has the authority to make. NAVAIR-5 34, as the GSE Program
Manager, can make a case that the expertise and authority
required to make these decisions falls under the control of
the functional organization but, as long as the APML controls
the GSE funds, he will be able to implement the F-13 project
plans. Also, it would appear the APML is in a better posi-
tion than the GSE Program Manager to protect GSE from arbi-
trary funding cuts. In the event of a cutback, the APML can
make tradeoffs across the support elements and this would
allow a systematic curtailment of support functions rather
than a cutback only in areas that had funds uncommitted.
The Logistic Element Managers within NAVAIR-OU have
generally adapted to the new order with less resistance than
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NAVAIR-5 34. Several reasons for this compliance can be
easily postulated. None of the NAVAIR-04- Logistic Element
Managers have a program management charter for their logis-
tic element and they are on the same organizational side as
the APML in any material acquisition vs. support jurisdic-
tional dispute. Also, conflicts within NAVAIR-04 would
tend to be resolved quicker and with less visibility than
conflicts across organizational lines.
It is interesting to speculate that perhaps some of
the resistance would not have occurred if a slightly differ-
ent method of implementing the F-18 support plans had been
decided on. An Assistant Project Manager for Support in the
Project Office, with the same responsibility as the APML,
would have the stature of the project office and might have
been able to accomplish the formal changes much more easily.
The pros and cons of this approach were discussed earlier and
will not be repeated here.
Referring back to the four support goals on page 65
it is apparent from the preceding discussion that a firm
commitment from the functional organizations to do assigned
tasks has not been totally achieved.
3 . Phased Support/Logistic Support Team
The F-18 project structured the Phased Support Con-
cept to deal with the deficiencies that have been identified
on previous projects. Phased Support recognizes that all
support elements, realistically, will not be ready at the
same point in time. Phased support is not really new. The
terminology of "augmented" or "interim" support are in common
7 n

use to indicate the measures undertaken by prior projects
when support problems occurred. The question then is not;
will Phased Support work, but rather; can Phased Support
be planned for from the start of the project?
The key element in a discussion of Phased Support
success or failure is the Logistic Support Team. Originally,
the Logistic Support Team was designed to be a part of the
Resident Integrated Logistic Support Detachment (RILSD) at
the contractor's facility. The F-18 project was not allowed
to structure the RILSD to include the Logistic Support team
because NAVAIR would not provide sufficient billets for a
large Navy team at the contractor's plant. This position
is understandable in view of the DOD restrictions on billets
and the existence of a large Air Force Plant Representative
Office at the contractor facility.
The NARF NORIS Logistic Support Team using MARF NORIS
billets is the method the APML chose to establish this essen-
tial ingredient to the F-18 support program. This is a
reasonable choice since NARF NORIS personnel were already
involved in reviewing Maintenance Plans for NAVAIR- M-ll and
NARF NORIS is the Prospective Cognizant Field Activity for
the F-18 Aircraft. However, there are some obvious draw-
backs to this arrangement.
1. Ideally the Logistic Support Team should be physical-
ly located at the contractor facility.
2. Choice of team members is limited.
3. NARF NORIS management goals for the Logistic Support
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team may not be the same as the F-18 project office goals
for this team.
4-
. Traditional role of the NARF is not consistent with
the role of the Logistic Support Team.
a. Location of Logistic Support Team
As shown in Figure 8 the Logistic Support Team
should primarily interact with NAVAIR Logistic Element Mana-
gers, Resident Integrated Logistic Support Detachment members,
Naval Air Engineering Center personnel and contractor person-
nel in carrying out their responsibilities. Extensive travel
would be required of the Logistic Support Team, if they were
located at the contractor facility. However, when the base
of operations is NARF NORIS in San Diego, the contractor is
in the midwest, and other elements are on the East Coast,
the situation during the F-18 Full Scale Development Phase
appears intolerable. This phase encompasses four years and
it is desirable to have the same personnel remain on the team.
The ability of this team to retain personnel and do an effec-
tive job of coordination is open to question.
b. Choice of Logistic Support Team Members
The strengh of the Resident Integrated Logistic
Support Detachment has been in having expertise at the con-
tractor's facility to accomplish day-to-day coordination.
Typically these members are rather carefully selected and,
coming from various organizations, they are able to provide
a broad spectrum of information by personally knowing the
type of capabilities and information available in their
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organizations. As noted in an article by Lorsch and
Lawrence the coordination function requires a balanced
orientation [Ref. 21, p. 388]. In the case of the F-18 pro-
ject a balanced support orientation should include represen-
tatives from a variety of support disciplines . The makeup
of the Resident Integrated Logistic Support Detachment ap-
pears to support this concept since members are specialists
in a particular field, retain allegiance to their parent
organization, and while on the team will be counterbalanced
by specialists from other disciplines.
With the selection of Resident Integrated Logis-
tic Support Detachment members used as the baseline, the
selection of Logistic Team Members from MARF NORIS has some
obvious drawbacks. The population from which the selection
is made is smaller and the same technical specialties do not
necessarily exist, to the same competence level, at the NARF
Also, considering the traditional role of the NARF, team
members' orientation might lean more toward an overhaul and
maintenance viewpoint than toward a balanced orientation
more closely suited to the coordination role,
c. Logistic Support Team Goals
The goals of NARF NORIS management in establish-
ing this team might tend to be of a longer term nature than
would be desirable for the F-18 Full Scale Development. The
advantages for the NARF are, as the Prospective Cognizant
Field Activity, that they are training a cadre of people on
the Logistic Support Team to manage the F-18 weapon system
when it comes under their control. Also, the Logistic
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Support Team would set a precedence for the NARF moving out
of its traditional Service Life Extension Program (SLEP)
role into the acquisition phase of the program life cycle.
The near-term impact on the F-18 project could
be a Logistic Support Team, that is a key item for support
system success, being made up of personnel that lack the
requisite training and experience.
d. Potential Coordination Conflicts
A close working relationship will be required
between Logistic Element Managers and the Logistic Support
Team. The potential for conflict is apparent in the fact
that the Logistic Support Team is taking over a coordination
function previously performed by the Logistic Element Mana-
gers as members of the Integrated Logistic Support Manage-
ment Team. A status problem can also be postulated since
it could appear, from a superficial look, that the NAVAIR
Logistic Element Manager's are working for personnel from a
NARF. However, these conflicts would probably exist to the
same extent if the Logistic Support Team was based in the
Resident Integrated Logistic Support Detachment. This prob-
lem must be considered in selection of team members since
these conflicts, over the long term, will be worked out on
a one-to-one basis and success will depend on the capabili-
ties of the individuals selected.
C. ALTERNATIVE ACQUISITION METHODS
Once the weapon system contract has been signed, the
Navy is in a weak negotiating position on any required
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additions to that contract. However, it is in this type of
sole source environment that procurement of PGSE is carried
out. The contractor specifies, costs, designs and develops
the PGSE after the original contract is negotiated. The
specifications require Navy approval and the costs are nego-
tiated, but the process is not competitive. This fact has
led to various alternatives being proposed for PGSE acquisi-
tion. The primary alternatives are separate competitive
procurement and Navy design and build. Variations of these





The coordination required, especially on a project
where design maturity has not been attained, between a weapon
system contractor and PGSE contractor appears formidable.
The time spent on the source selection process and contract
administration would, it appears, further delay PGSE acquisi-
tion. Erom the standpoint of quality of equipment it would
seem the Navy cannot improve the acquisition process by add-
ing another interface. Whether cost would be substantially
less is open to debate since many other costs incurred by
the Navy would need to be included.
2 Navy Build
The Navy certainly has the capability to build most
of its own PGSE. The management of the interfaces would,
to some extent, be the same as required for competitive pro-
curement although the Navy would not have to spend resources
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on contract administration. Again the cost effectiveness
of this approach is open to debate and becomes an accounting
exercise in adding up true costs. Also the political impli-
cations of the Navy competing with a contractor is an issue
that might make the discussion academic.
To a certain extent the high cost of PGSE can be
attributed to the interface management that the Navy is buy-
ing. The complexity of technical coordination should not
be overlooked in comparing Navy costs to build vs. contractor
cost to build. This is not to imply that PGSE costs are
reasonable. What it does imply is that the Navy can probably
more effectively use its resources by specifying in the
original contract, as much of the PGSE performance require-
ment as can be defined, and then provide sufficient numbers
of technically competent personnel to monitor the PGSE ac-






While this thesis does not go into the details of the
PGSE acquisition procedures , they were scrutinized by the
authors at sufficient length during their background re-
search to determine that they comprised a well-thought-out,
comprehensive, logically consistent and potentially effec-
tive process. It was found, however, that the NAVAIR
political environment and management structure made imple-
mentation of these procedures so difficult that it is
through innovations in organizations and management technique
that the F-18 Project is trying to enforce adherence to
stated support policies.
A. MANAGEMENT STRUCTURE
The conclusions which can be drawn from the prior discus-
sion on management structure are summarized in Figure 9.
In this figure, the decision tree of Figure 7 is redrawn in
the form of a series of hanging scales to illustrate the
"balance" of the authors' conclusions at each decision point.
For reasons stated in the discussion section, there can
be no serious consideration to making PGSE acquisition man-
agement responsive to the Class Desk rather than the APML.
The authors believe that whether any project can be given
appropriate responsiveness from its APM-GSE is as much a func-























political environment as anything else. In order to facili-
tate the required responsiveness of any APM-GSE to his pro-
ject's support policies, and hence to his APML, the APM-GSE
should be organizationally situated in AIR-04 as are the
other LEMs. It is determined that the benefits to be de-
rived by moving AIR-534 into the AIR- 4 Group, in terms of
increased project responsiveness and integration with other
support functions, outweigh any drawbacks in having the GSE
Program iManager in AIR- 4.
If the GSE Division would move to AIR- 4, as the authors
think it should, then the APML could probably best manage a
project's support program by remaining in AIR-410. Also,
NAVAIR could probably eliminate AIR-417 and have AIR-410 or
the GSE Division assume the responsibility for GSE logistic
support. These latter two conclusions are not as significant,
however, as the decision to move AIR-534.
The questions of APML location and the requirement for
AIR-417 take on major significance when the GSE Division is
in AIR-05, as it currently is. Since there is no reason to
believe that AIR-534 could manage logistic support from the
AIR-05 side, clearly this responsibility must remain in AIR-
04. In lieu of further study, it must be concluded that the
present AIR-410/AIR-5 34 situation calls for the existence of
a separate organization for the management of logistic support
for GSE, e.g., AIR-417. Another consequence of not moving
AIR-534, is the lack of an APML's ability to rely on his posi-
tion as a functional area assistant project manager to effi-
ciently carry out his tasks in accordance with the project
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management approach, although there are probably exceptions
to be found, depending on the particular project. Therefore,
in the current environment with the political considerations
discussed earlier, it would be generally beneficial for the
APML to have the status and authority of a PMA-XXXX code.
B. F-18 APPROACH
The F-18 project has elevated support system performance
to a co-equal status with weapon system performance. The
availability of resources , because of support system visi-
bility, has resulted in detailed early planning. The early
planning recognized a single Navy support date was unrealis-
tic and evolved Phased Support as a planned, orderly intro-
duction of fleet support capability. This support concept
required dividing the aircraft systems into manageable func-
tional groups. Coordination of logistic elements for each
functional group established the need for the Logistic Support
Team. Finally the APML needed to control support funds in
order to manage the support development and accomplish support
system tradeoffs
.
The logic of this process is inescapable. As a coordi-
nated whole the F-18 proj ect ' s acquisition strategy has wide
acceptance. Areas of disagreement involving PGSE acquisition
revolve around the implementation of specific features of
the overall concept. In actuality, these areas of disagree-
ment are more of a political nature than substantive issues.
The real issue, inherent in the visible problems, is APML
control of support system acquisition. This change threatens

the established routines and results in territorial disputes,
The F-18 project appears to be making progress toward over-
coming these obstacles in spite of the political and organi-
zational environment.
The responsibilities and coordination duties of the
Logistic Support Team were examined in great detail since
this team is critical to the success of Phased Support man-
agement. The project demands on this team will be substan-
tial and, in the authors' judgement, several factors have
impacted the establishment of this team and will limit its
effectiveness. The most important of these are the location
of the Logistic Support Team on the West Coast and a poten-
tial lack of balance in team experience.
Relative success or failure of the F-18 PGSE acquisition
strategy will not be known for 6-10 years. In the meantime
the F-18 project has a logical, methodical approach to
support system development. The execution of that plan
requires good management and organizational discipline. The
success or failure of the F-18 approach will be judged on
how well the project support plan is implemented. The plan




Specific recommendations have resulted from the work car-
ried out on this thesis. These recommendations have specific
impact on PGSE acquisition management. Because PGSE acquisi-
tion is a subset of the larger support acquisition category
these recommendations necessarily impact this larger topic.
Recommendations have only been made that, in the authors'
judgement, would also enhance the overall support acquisition
function.
In considering these recommendations , it should be recog-
nized that organizational realignments are only one factor
in achieving management effectiveness. Continued attention
must be directed to aligning organizational goals and individ-
ual goals. A formal structure is only the foundation upon
which an organization can be developed to achieve this objec-
tive .
1. In balancing functional interactions and responsibili-
ties it appears that the NAVAIR-5 3M- GSE Division more appro-
priately belongs in NAVAIR-04. Related to this move, the
function of NAVAIR-417 may be absorbed into existing NAVAIR-04
Divisions to eliminate differences in procedures and duplica-
tions of logistic management functions.
2. If a realignment of NAVAIR-534 into NAVAIR-04 cannot
be realized, PMA-265 should consider moving the F-18 APML from
NAVAIR-M-10 into the project office. In any case, more project
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office influence must be brought to bear in establishing
the APML as the F-18 support system manager.
3. The staffing and functioning of the Logistic Support
Team are critical to the success of F-18 phased support.
Every attempt should be made to establish this team as part
of the Resident Integrated Logistic Support Detachment at
the contractor facility.
In the process of accomplishing the work on this thesis
several areas have been identified where further study could
be beneficial. An in-depth study of these topics was not
within the scope of this thesis but these topics were recog-
nized as having a potential for improvement that could have
an impact on PGSE acquisition. These topics are listed as
follows
:
M- . Test Program Sets used on Automatic Test Equipment
are a subset of PGSE. This area has some unique problems
and procedures that warrant a separate in-depth study.
5. Innovation in PGSE contracting methods and contrac-
tual PGSE performance incentives are an area of great
potential payoff. Further in-depth study of possible PGSE
contract provisions and alternative methods of procurement
is warranted.
6. Further study of the necessity of a separate logis-
tic support division for GSE, NAVAIR-4-17, would be useful.
This study would be beneficial whether MAVAIR-53M- remains





In 1963, recognizing the need for a more organized ap-
proach to logistics planning, the Navy issued WR-30, a
weapon requirement entitled "Integrated Maintenance Manage-
ment for Aeronautical Weapons, Weapon Systems and Related
Equipment." This document was reinforced in the following
year by DOD Directive 4-100.35, "Development of Integrated
Logistic Support for Systems and Equipments" [Ref. 24].
DOD DIR 4100.35 was the first official document to de-
fine the main elements of ILS. Since then, there has been
much literature addressing this subject with somewhat less
than 10 0% agreement as to what these main elements should
be called and into how many categories they should be placed
On May 18, 1971, the Chief of Naval Material (CNM) issued
NAVMAT Instruction 4000. 20A, "Integrated Logistic Support
Planning Policy." This document defines ILS to be [Ref. 25]
:
A composite of all the support considerations neces-
sary to assure the effective and economical support of
system/equipments for their life cycle. It is an inte-
gral part of system/equipment acquisition and operation
and is characterized by harmony and coherence among all
the logistic elements. The principal elements (defined
in DOD Guide 4100. 35G) related to the overall system/
equipment life cycles, include:
a. Maintenance Plan
b. Support and Test Equipment
c. Supply Support





g. Personnel and Training
h. Logistic Support Resource Funds
i. Logistic Support Management Information
There are, of course, activities and programs within any
weapon system acquisition project with which the logistic
support process must be compatible and with which a high de-
gree of coordination and cooperation must be attained.
According to the Chief of Naval Material, the following are









g. Life Cycle Costing
h. Standardization
i. Environmental Impact Statements
The Project Master Plan (PMP) contains a document called
the Integrated Logistic Support Plan (ILSP), which combines
all of the logistic support documentation. The ILSP, accord-
ing to DOD, is:
The Government's detailed ILS management plan for a
specific acquisition program. Provides a comprehensive
plan for implementing the logistic concepts, techniques
and policies necessary to assure the effective economi-
cal support of a system/equipment during its life cycle.

It is a dynamic document which continually grows with
the increased availability of information, and provides
for integration of logistic elements into program plan-
ning, development, test and evaluation, production and
operational processes [Ref. 26].
The Assistant Project Manager for Logistics (APML) is
responsible for the overall design, management, control and
effectivenss of the ILS program for the project to which he
is assigned. Normally, the APML is assigned to a project
out of AIR-410 with concurrence of the PMA. The APML,
while usually dedicated to a project and depended upon by
the PMA, retains line responsibility to the AIR- 4 organi-
zation. His funds, however, must come solely through the
project office.
The APML accomplishes his tasks, primarily, by coordinat-
ing the efforts of the Logistic Element Managers (LEMs),
who are responsible for the management of specific support
elements such as test and support equipment, spare and
repair parts, personnel, and facilities. A LEM is usually
a representative of one of the AIR-04 logistic support divi-
sions. Each LEM has the ultimate objective of the effective
acquisition, timely deployment and in-service management
of specific support items. Although much of the funding
available for this support, particularly in the planning
phases, must be provided by the project office, all LEMs
remain line-responsible to their parent organization, e.g.
AIR-04.
The great amount of coordination which must take place,
not only between the Navy's participants but also with the
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contractor, is accomplished by both formal and informal
means. The formal coordination is supposed to be accom-
plished by means of the periodic meetings of the Integrated
Logistic Support Management Team (ILSMT), which is com-
prised primarily of the LEMs and their contractor counter-





Personnel from the following organizations were inter-
viewed during the course of the study:
NAVAIR
F-18 Project Office






Naval Air Engineering Center
Naval Aviation Logistics Center







INTERVIEW TECHNIQUE AND KEY QUESTIONS
In conducting over 2 5 interviews with individuals from
seven organizations the authors' attempted to ask a standard
set of core questions. In addition to these questions many
other topics were explored as they arose. Also, in some
cases all the questions were not appropriate, or time con-
straints limited discussions to only the major topics.
The interviews were not conducted as formal question
and answer sessions. A brief introduction of the purpose
of the thesis research followed by a few general questions
generally set the stage, and most interviewees, as a matter
of course, answered many of the questions without any prompt-
ing. This process was educational since it indicated the
major concerns and viewpoints of the interviewees
.
In general, the authors cannot emphasize enough the
value of conducting personal interviews . Interviews provide
a much more informal and productive method of communication
and allows an individualized approach to collecting infor-
mation.
The following is a list of typical questions used by the
authors during interviews.
1. What is your function in PGSE acquisition and where
do you fit organizationally?




3. What improvements could be made in PGSE acquisition,
both procedurally and organizationally?
4. Can the extensive time required for PGSE acquisition
be shortened?
5. Why is PGSE so expensive?
6. How do you ensure a contractor will not gold-plate
PGSE?
7. Are there any alternative ways to accomplish PGSE
acquisition?
8. Is support really considered as important as aircraft
performance on the F-18 project?
9. How is the F-18 approach to PGSE acquisition differ-
ent from past projects?
10. What is your understanding of the F-18 Phased
Support Concept?
11. Is Phased Support new?
12. Will there be improvements in the F-18 weapon system




F-18 AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS FUNCTIONAL GROUPS
The Logistic Support Team at NARF NORIS is comprised of
nine individuals who will each be responsible for tracking
the logistic support efforts for each system in one of the
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